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BEING AT THE EDGE OF PLACE: MODERN, ANCIENT, AND POSTMODERN 





In this seminar talk, I will attempt to put together for the first time my previous 
work on place and my new work on edges. The challenge is to imagine how 
these two directions fit, or fail to fit, together.  
 
At first glance, they would seem to have little to do with one another: 
 
-- places, we presume, exist under foot; they act to locate and stabilize 
 us; to give us (literal) grounding; to be what we can rely on; to situate 
us in the world; to be terra firma underneath our distracted 
lives, providing anchor to the dispersion, a basis for the oblivion  
that continually acts to undermine our more or less secure being in 
the world; to provide center to our decentered worlds; 
 
-- edges, on the other hand, would appear to be a decentering force par 
excellence; they exist at the extremities of things, to be their outer limit, 
their containing force; after all, don’t we measure the size and shape of 
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things by their outer edges?; and edges need not be strictly spatial to 
play this role: temporal edges delimit events, large and small, 
including the event of our life: death, says, Hamlet, is “the bourn [an 
Elizabethan term for edge] from which no traveler returns”; in their 
very extremity, however, they act as much to destabilize as to contain 
human (and other animal) lives; surely this is why we say (in English, 
but I trust in other European languages as well) that we are 
“on edge” when referring to an upsetting or nervous-making event; if 
a place draws us in and down, an edge draws us out – out to the limits 
of our energies and patience, our very life finally. 
 
On further reflection, however, we realize that places and edges are more 
convergent than we first imagined. Consider only these basic points: 
 
(1) every place is finite – in contrast with space, which can be infinite in 
extent; and to be finite is to have, it is to have to have, an edge – where 
“edge” here signifies ‘end’, as is connoted in finis, the Latin root of 
“finite”; for a place to be unending is for it to cease to be a place and to 
bid fair as a candidate for space; moreover, edge-as-end can be spatial 
or temporal, or both; in either case, it is where something, or some 
event, runs out, ceases to be; 
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(2) edges can be of many things == of “things” themselves (whatever they 
may be), of events, of whole landscapes, of stories, of words, of 
thoughts; but among these are certainly places: think of almost  any 
extended edge and you will find it to circumscribe a place per se, or  
at least something set in a place such that the edge of the thing or event 
has an internal relationship with that place: say, the edge of an apple 
on a table that is located in a room, in short a prototypical place; the 
edges of the apple and the table are situated within the edges of the 
room, placed there, as we say almost irresistibly;  
 
In this way, then, edge and place show themselves to be deeply affine with each 
other, each calling to the other, indeed each requiring the other. Despite all their 
manifest differences, they form an indissociable dyad.  
 
     I 
 
 But we do not yet know the answer to two very basic questions, which  
are preliminary to everything I have so far said: What is an edge? What is a 
place?  
 An Edge. Formally (in topological geometry), an edge is a convex dihedral 
angle: that is, where two more or less straight lines come together to form a 
single figure of conjunction: this figure as viewed from the outside of the lines, 
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not from the inside (in which case, we have to do with a corner).1
 Whether considered formally or materially, an edge always delimits; and 
in this capacity, it determines volume (size, mass, weight) as well as shape 
(contour, outline). As delimiting, an edge also serves to specify whether 
something presents itself as sharp, rounded, umbelliform, doughnut-saped, etc. 
 Materially, an 
edge is typically where two entire sides (not just lines) meet; or, viewed from the 
point of conjunction, where these same sides diverge, each going its own way; 
the two-wayness of the implicit visual vector is part of being an edge, which in 
effect both attracts and repells attention: attracts it as we “come to the edge” 
(which is akin to “coming to the point”), repells it by sending it away from the 
edge itself – where “the edge itself” is the salient structure, the focus of an edge-
consciousness. 
 A sailing ship is passing before me on the deck where I write these words 
in Maine. The edges of its sails configure them as three triangular structures, 
differing somewhat in size and shape, but all are active in propelling the ship 
forward by means of the wind that is caught up in the sails, pressing itself 
against their cloth surfaces. At the same time, the contour of the hull shows itself 
through its edges, curving in certain ways and not others. This simple example, 
taken from current perception, shows how crucial edges are: they act to specify 
the kind of vessel I see as well as its individual peculiarities, and they present its 
                                                        
1 For these formal approaches to edge and corner, see J.J. Gibson, An Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception, glossary. 
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forward movement as a coherent action that is intimately related to the character 
of its sails and the form of its hull. All these edge qualities are material in my 
nomenclature, being manifest in the very matter from which the ship is built; but 
tacitly present as well are the formal properties of the sails regarded as triangles 
and of the hull seen as a modified cylinder.  
 In addition, edges have both epistemic and metaphysical powers which 
we don’t usually consider upon encountering ordinary edges. Epistemically, 
edges are essential in identifying – recognizing and perceiving – something as of 
a certain type: say, a middle-sized sailing ship that is moving across Stonington 
Cove. We often know something by the edges it presents, its “profile,” as when 
we recognize someone who walks toward us in the near distance: that must be 
“Dick,” we say, upon spotting a figure with whom we are familiar (or were once 
familiar: the exact configuration of the edges of a person or thing remain 
remarkably constant over time, even as that person and we ourselves have aged 
in the meanwhile). The same is true of the most ordinary objects: a hammer, a 
table, a fork. It holds as well for literary characters, whose major outlines we 
recognize through the verbal descriptions given of them by an author: no more 
than we need a complete presentation of the edges of a physical object do we 
need the full description of a literary character: such a character remains known 
to the reader even if his or her description is shot through with indeterminacies 
and opacities, rendering the depiction “opalescent” in Roman Ingarden’s telling 
term. Even the dimmest descriptions – such as the otherwise unidentified 
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character in Joyce’s Ulysees about whom we are only told that he wears “a 
MacIntosh” – contain edges by which to identify her or him: in this case, the 
tailored edges of a certain kind of overcoat that was prominent in the first two 
decades of the last century in western Europe.  
 Metaphysically, edges are very curious entities – or perhaps we should 
say non-entities. An edge is where something still is, still exists materially, yet at 
the same time is about not to be. At the edge, a thing is thinning out, its material 
substance is beginning to vanish; and by the time we get to the edge itself – to the 
outermost part of an edge – the same thing has ceased to be at the level of such 
substance. What Wallace Stevens said of a sky is true of an edge as well: “the sky 
is acutest at its vanishing.” The more we come to the end of an edge the less is it 
there as an object: it is petering or running out, rapidly becoming nothing: 
literally, “no thing.” Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, was reported to 
have sharpened the edge of a knife in his youth so assiduously that it finally 
disappeared altogether: that is what every edge does, sooner or later. When 
Hamlet says in his celebrated soliloquy, “To be or not to be, that is the question,” 
he could well have been speaking of edges.  
 An edge, then, is at once something quite definitive (a word in which we 
cannot help but notice the finis root) and yet also quite ambiguous. It is crucial to 
identifying something as that something, but it does so in a manner that is 
strikingly two-sided in its description. No matter how clearly presented or 
perceived it may be, an edge is something that both comes and goes, starts and 
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finishes, closes and opens – and this list could continue indefinitely. The truth is 
that edges have a genius for combining manifest contraries or contradictories; yet 
they (acting as the outer mark of that for which they serve as delimitations) are 
for the most part easily grasped and readily identifiable. They are very 
strange beings that are equally non-beings: beings on the way to non-being, 
thereby providing the deepest ambiguity of all.  
 A place, by contrast, is nothing so strange, at least not at first glance. It is 
reassuring in its very presence, being solidly here. (When Rilke said in the Duino 
Elegies that “hiersein ist herrlich,” he might well have been talking of everyday 
places, which are felicitous in their very accessibility, present in their 
comparative transparency.) Contributing to the reliability of place are a number 
of its major traits: for example, its deeply orientational powers, which allow it to 
give direction when we are otherwise lost, to provide for dwelling (hence the 
expression “home-place”), and to hold personal and collective history. Perhaps 
most impressively, place is often the basis for personal identity: “our place is part 
of what we are,” as Gary Snyder remarks.2
                                                        
2 Gary Snyder, The Practice of the Wild, p. 29. 
 The link between self and place is 
profound; they compenetrate each other extensively. In meeting a stranger for 
the first time, we often ask “Where are you from?” Our assumption is that the 
place of origin will give us a crucial clue as to the character and proclivity of 
someone whom we do not otherwise know. Even if place and identity are 
distinguishable, they remain inseparable in many respects. One concrete reason 
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for this is that our body is often the lived link between them: just as there is no 
body without place – no unimplaced body: angels, which have no material 
bodies, also lack places: thus the medieval conundrum about how many angels 
can dance on the head of a pin – so there is no place without the animating force 
of a living body in its midst: bodies energize places, as is so evident in animal 
dens and lairs -- that is, places made expressly to fit animals’ bodies closely.  
Nevertheless, what the Romans called stabilitas loci (“stability of place”) 
proves to be quite vulnerable, as we can see from the rapidly changing fortunes 
of Roman history itself. Even if places are deeply situating, they can also be quite 
fragile. In the end, places have their own ambiguity. They are expansive insofar 
as they provide room for much that we would like to put into them; yet they are 
also contractive in their delimitative and containing powers. A given place 
presents itself as directly underfoot, part of terra firma, but it can also surround 
us, being all around us; a place is at once a locus and a landscape, here for sure 
but also there (though not “over there,” that is, located outside the periphery of 
place). Places are both determinate (as this place, with its own idiolocality) and 
indeterminate, as we can see from the difficulty of specifying exactly where a 
given place begins or ends. A major ambiguity is found in the fact that places are 
not only spatial, as we often presume; they also bear history and narrative: but 
this means that they are themselves temporal, as when a given event in effect 
offers a location for certain actions: “in the French Revolution,” we say 
confidently, “the rights of man were first formulated.” Here, the event of the 
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French Revolution serves as a historical place, a scene of happening. (Strictly 
speaking, “event” is a spatio-temporal term, possessing both dimensions. But I 
would maintain that, ultimately, a place is an event.) 
Despite these ambiguities, places subtend our (and other animals’) being 
in the world. This is why I like to speak of entire “place-worlds” that given 
places make possible. Nothing of comparable ontological important can be said 
of edges, which are in effect the extremities of places and events just as they 
delimit things and people: rendering all four finite in extent.  
 
    II 
 
This brings us to border and boundary. Strictly speaking, these are kinds 
of edge. In that perspective, they are merely two among at least fifteen by my 
current count. But in fact they are very special sorts of edge: primae inter pares, 
so to speak. Their prominence has emerged for me in the last few years, 
especially in my recent work on La Frontera, the U.S.-Mexico border: a political 
hot-spot but also a complex edge that raises important spatial issues of the very 
sort have come to preoccupy me in recent times. And in this particular case, we 
have a situation in which what is called a “border” – an international border, at 
that – shows itself to be at the same time a boundary. Let me say more about 
what I have in mind here by the following comments on basic differences 
between “border” and “boundary”: 
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 border: a border is an edge that aims at being definitive by virtue of being 
closed and continuous. On my construal, it is an artefact of a prior agreement 
reached by human beings who have decided on the wisdom (often pitched as 
“necessity”) of a definite division between nations, counties, or provinces. It is 
very often a “compromise formation” (in Freud’s term) that, despite its 
contingent origins, is taken to be fixed once it is set in place – a phrase that is far 
from idle, since places that are established at certain historical moments, often in 
the wake of war (e.g., the U.S.-Mexican War of 1848), call for definitive 
demarcations of their agreed-upon limits: “this far and no further,” “on this side 
France, on that German,” as we say in telling phrases. 
 In my view, there are two main forms of border, regarded as an actual 
entity, a distinctive kind of edge:  
(a) cartographic: this assumes the form of a drawn or printed line that is at 
once ideal and imposed (since it doesn’t exist on the earth, or on the sea, 
itself). Most often, borders in this inscriptive format are represented on 
maps, particularly those maps that stake out territories – typically, those 
that set forth the claims of national sovereignty.  
(b) material: in contrast with the ideal (I would prefer to say, after Husserl, 
“irreal”) status of cartographically instilled borders, there are those that 
are literally built. In this avatar, borders often assume the form of walls or 
comparable barriers that are constructed from materials that are heavy, 
opaque, and impassable. Paradigmatic here are such instances as the 
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Great Wall of China, the Berlin Wall – and the currently active Separation 
Wall between Israel and Palestine, and La Frontera. In these latter 
instances, the contemporary technology of wall construction combines 
with the same will to exclude and separate. (Sometimes, in fact, the same 
international construction companies are involved in the building of such 
walls: Bechtel in the latter two instances. [check this out].) 
Only in those instances in which there is already a massive natural  
feature of the local landscape can such construction be avoided – a feature 
that itself acts as an effective impediment to the easy flow of human 
traffic: say, rugged mountain terrain or a raging river. In that case, the 
border is literally realized by such a feature, which on its own acts to close 
off in a continuous and definitive manner. Thus, for fully two-thirds of its 
entire length, La Frontera consists in the Río Grande River – just as the 
Alps acts as a border between Switzerland and Italy. But the factor of 
artifice remains indispensable, since it is not the mountain chain as such or 
the whole river that is the effective border but an imagined line that is 
projected onto the chain or the river. Such a line has to possess precise 
specifications – ultimately, those of latitude and longitude – that 
determine it was a matter of “simple location” in Whitehead’s term for 
any position that is marked in a homogeneous world-space or world-time. 
And this requirement in turn leads to certain complications presenting 
their own challenge: for example, just where in the midst of the Río 
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Grande is La Frontera to be located? Conventionally, it is projected into 
the middle of the river; but the breadth of the river changes its extent in 
different seasons – with spring rains it is quite broad; in summer, it is a 
bare trickle, if that. Clearly, the exact location of the summer of the Río 
Grande is not that “simple.” That middle will change places from April to 
August: it will be a different edge in a differently configured natural 
place. Thus the complications that artificial imposition brings with it are 
visited upon the natural landscape – with the results that the international 
border is a distinctly hybrid entity. 
 Boundary. Boundaries are porous, passable, and informally created 
and often discontinuous edges. They arise characteristically from 
spontaneously generated processes – and are, for this reason, 
paradigmatically located in the natural world. Examples are trails that are 
laid down by animals and humans – “laid down” by the very motion of 
their bodies, not intentionally created by these creatures. Ridges on 
mountains, outcroppings of stone that constitute a coherent edge: these 
are other instances of boundaries that are encountered in the course of 
human and animal experience. Animals are especially adept in the 
creation and discernment of boundaries: as when certain species leave 
recognizable scents to mark their “territories.” These are semiotic rather 
than symbolic in status: they signify to the effect that ‘our territorial claims 
extend to here’, where the ‘here’ is not formally or precisely designated 
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but (quite literally) sensed – hence subject to variations in keeping with 
vegetative growth, climatic change, seasons, etc. These markings are 
meaningful, but they do not constitute a symbolic system with its own 
separate code whose content could be translated into verbal statements. 
(This is why animals here join forces with human beings in the making 
and detecting of naturally generated boundaries: for example, in animal 
migration patterns whose counterpart is nomadic circulation between 
known places.) 
 Boundaries of this quintessential sort are comparatively abundant 
and easily identified. But the plot thickens when we consider an edge 
circumstance such as that of La Frontera. There, birds fly freely over the 
wall that otherwise impedes humans and certain land animals. But 
determined and ingenious migrants, to prevent whose movement the wall 
was constructed in the first place (along with drug traffickers), 
nevertheless manage to make it past the wall (by scaling it, tunneling 
under it, etc.) or else go around it (though often to great peril awaiting 
them in the desert). In deliberate parody of this situation, a human being 
was shot from a canon over the wall at Tijuana several years ago. Those 
migrants who get beyond the wall are in effect making a boundary out of 
a border, puncturing holes in a presumably impenetrable barrier. They 
turn something literally aporetic (‘without opening’) into something 
poretic, filled with gaps or holes, allowing the wall to breathe, albeit 
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furtively and momentarily. This indicates that what begins as a strict 
border is subject to transformation into something boundary-like. Indeed, 
I would say that every strictly established and policed border, no matter 
how arduously maintained, ends by becoming a boundary. Witness the 
Great Wall of China, which has now become a major site for tourists, who 
clamber on and over it freely and at their leisure.  
In a free variation on Robert Frost’s famous line – “something there 
is that doesn’t love a wall” – I would say that “there is something in a wall 
that doesn’t love itself, that wants to come down.” At least this is so for 
walls that purport to be impenetrable borders – to keep human and 
animal traffic to a strict minimum, allowing only those with the proper 
papers, or other legitimizing marks, to traverse it. Despite the sternest 
effort to enforce this minimum, the wall (or any other artificial border), 
even if continually reinforced in its materiality, always has a limited 
future in the context of social and political vicissitudes that were not 
foreseen at the time of its construction. This indicates an intrinsic fragility 
of borders that is the flip side of their ideal and imposed character. While 
they are up and running, they can be quite effective, and can separate 
whole peoples and cultures, as we see in the case of the DMZ between 
North and South Korea. But they are not perduring; their course is 
contingent; they will dissolve, or will at least diminish in their appointed 
powers. 
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Thus, despite the deeply wrought differences between borders and 
boundaries, they overlap in their inherent finitude – both being subject to 
the vagaries of fate and fortune. And despite their being such disparate 
kinds of edges, both are, in the end, features of places. For a given border, 
just like a certain boundary, constitutes the edge of some particular place. 
Each is an edge of a region, a territory, or a nation: all of which I consider 
species of place. These two leading and highly contrastive sorts of edges, 
rejoin in constituting (or at least marking) the limits of a given place, being 
the outermost extremity of that place. (I here leave aside internal edges, 
which have their own function and logic.) Both bring a place to a close, 
whether the closure is itself tightly sealed or open-ended. At this point, 
and in this way, they converge across their manifest divergences.  
            III 
 
 Postmodernism and place – another odd couple, even odder than place 
and edge taken together. Let us only juxtapose them in a preliminary way: 
Postmodernism, if it means anything, presumes globalization:  depends on it and 
contributes to it. And globalization in turn signifies space: neutral, 
homogeneous, spread-out space. “The world is my oyster”: an old saying in 
English that takes on new force with the advent of electronic technologies of 
communication. Thanks to these technologies, we can get anywhere – at least 
virtually – almost anytime (assuming we are awake and alert). For globalized 
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space lends it to the kind of grids and other planiform spaces that lend 
themselves to exact mapping –to “cartography” in the strict sense that I 
distinguish from “chorography,” which is the mapping of particular places and 
regions. In these spaces, anything that might count as a place has become a 
position, a position in world-space. And each such position belongs to a site, 
which is at once abstract and functional (and one because the other). Every such 
site is (more or less) equal and (mostly) indifferent. If nothing is real in world-
space – a space of representation, a space in which nothing can be touched – 
everything is possible in that space: hence its powerful allure but equally its 
superficiality. But it is possible only within the pre-established parameters of 
global space, and these are strictly delimited: not just by their definitions but by 
what they can do, which is to operate in accordance with prevailing technologies 
– and behind them the regnant forces of global capitalism, colluding with nation 
states and multinational corporations. How could there be room for place in a 
circumstance in which everything smacking of place is leveled down by motives 
of domination, efficiency, and profit? 
Place, in contrast, is always and only particular; it thrives on an intense locality 
that is the very converse of the globalized space that subtends postmodernism. 
Where such space is thinned out and empty of anything real – there, being is 
virtual – place is dense and thick: dense and thick with history and with body. 
What matters here, above all, is where you are, not what role you have in a late 
capitalist economy (that is, how productive you are). For place is the ultimate 
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wherein (Heidegger calls it das Worin) that gives direction and identity to the 
lives of those inhabiting that place. Rather than being juxtaposed with another 
space indifferently, places are enclosed by horizons, which adumbrate what is to 
come (in time) and the elsewhere (in space). In between a place and the horizon 
is a landscape, which can be neither owned nor mapped: which is unpossessable 
in these modalities. Thanks to its horizons – themselves special forms of edges – 
places are enclosed but not contained. (In other words, horizons count as 
boundaries in my nomenclature: they are thoroughly poretic. Underlying all this 
basic triad of place, landscape, and horizon, is the lived body, which as we’ve 
seen animates the whole scene from within, breathing continual life in them from 
below. 
 Despite these divisive and decisive differences, place and the postmodern 
(which I here construe in the form of globalized space) show themselves to 
counterparts: incongruous ones, to be sure, but counterparts nonetheless. Each 
calls to the other for support and completion, however indirectly and remotely. 
Even if from across these differences, each provides what the other lacks: it gives 
a certain subtle substance to the postmodern sense of space, while this same 
space offers leeway to places that might otherwise be quite confined. Other 
counterpart aspects include the fact that place encloses while space opens out. 
Where place fosters a settled (but not fixed) identity and orientation, postmodern 
spatiality favors the search for new identity when one is willing to be subjected 
to at least momentary disorientation. And while the virtual vacuum induced by 
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global communicational matrices renders history superfluous (or at least 
secondary), place engenders and preserves history at a personal and collective 
level.  
 I do not mean to suggest that these complementary relations are always 
symmetrical, much less that they are always present. They are dependent on 
circumstances, but when they do occur they reveal the deep potential for 
collaboration between two otherwise disparate vectors of human experience. 
We see this collaboration in a dramatic form when in the wake of McLuhan we 
speak of “the global village” or after Deleuze and Guattari of “the local 
absolute”: here the parochial joins forces with what is universal in scope, each 
benefitting from such intimacy. Here place gains scope while the global finds 
focus. A single example of this is found in “google mapping” whereby virtually 
anywhere on earth (hence on a global scale) can be shown in a close-up format: 
the very image of your own house and street here appears. 
 Still others have pointed to this incongruous relationship. Thus Robert 
Smithson, the earth artist, liked to say that the postmodern has an unlikely ally in 
the premodern; both leap over the modern as if it were an immense aberration. 
His celebrated “Spiral Jetty,” for example – the helix created from stones in the 
Great Salt Lake – has a Neolithic feeling to it even though its conception was 
born from Smithson’s postmodern deconstruction of modern art:  
         [SHOW SLIDE OF “SPIRAL JETTY”?] 
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 Let us say that the postmodern and place conjoin insofar as (a) the 
postmodern not only looks forward in its innovative proclivity but actively harks 
back to earlier moments of history; and (b) place, for its part, leaps forward every 
bit as much as it looks back: it does so by its inherent synergies, which are 
released when its edges are boundary-like. Only a border attempts to foreclose  
An open future – to reduce its risk by eliminating chance as much as possible. In 
this double-sided way, place and the postmodern meet in the middle where 
ostensible opposites converge: especially the past and the future, but also (as I 
emphasized earlier) open space and enclosed locus. Thus they mix in a 
composite spatio-temporal shared zone that has the character of “transitional 
space” in Winnicott’s sense of a play area where creative action is engendered.  
 In view of these claims, two caveats must be made: first, I am not 
construing “postmodern” in the senses of pastiche, citational parody, or textual 
irony – senses that sometimes dominate in popular discussions. I am interpreting 
the postmodern as a matter of a newly emerging idea of space: the global virtual 
space that is made possible by electronic communications. Second, I am not 
taking “place” to mean something backward-looking – that is nothing but a 
repository for personal or collective identity, much less a mere trigger for 
nostalgia. Quite to the contrary, on my view place has an ingredient futurity that 
belongs to it intrinsically: a futurity that is the temporal equivalent of the 
horizons that ring about a given place. Just as space has to be re-thought as place, 
so the temporality of place itself must be conceived anew if it is to collude with 
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the postmodern in the various ways that I consider are as urgent as they are 
timely. 
 
        IV 
 
 Implicitly – and sometimes quite explicitly – structuring this talk of mine 
today has been the ancient model of the “indefinite dyad” as Plato called it. This 
is the conjunction of two pairs of terms such as odd and even, same and 
different, one and many. (I also note in passing that if this is true we have.) I’ve 
now in effect identified three such dyads: place and edge, border and boundary, 
and the postmodern and place. Despite their internal differences, each member 
of each pair belongs together with the other member, however imperfect may be 
their fit. (Perfect fit is exactly what they are not about. If their fit was truly perfect 
– flawless, with no loose ends left over – they would be no longer be counter-
parts; indeed, they would no longer be a dyad but a monad, one thing with two 
precisely contiguous parts. There might be a discernible fissure line between 
them -- as when two blocks fit exactly together -- but such such a line would not 
undermine their oneness. They would be like two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that, 
once brought together, forms an image of a single undivided object.)  
 If the terms I’ve been comparing form indefinite dyads, we’d have another 
instance before us of the bond between the premodern and the postmodern. My 
suspicion is that such a bond is much more widespread than we assume when 
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we regard the postmodern world as “progress” of some sort – in any case, as 
beckoning toward the future, or as being our future. 
 Notice that in the series of six terms that divide into three such dyads – 
namely, place/edge/border/boundary/postmodern/place – place is located at 
each end of the series as I have constructed it. This seems to indicate not just that 
place is especially marked in such a series but that it opens and closes the series 
itself as a whole. (As a whole, we can call the series “the game of space”; but we 
can do so only if we admit that it is equally a game of time, given that place qua 
event is both spatial and temporal: both at once.) Place, we might say, stands at 
the two portals of the series – like a silent sentinel that inaugurates it and then 
ends it, thereby reminding us of place’s unique power to initiate the new and to 
encompass what is now happening as well as about to happen (again, the 
horizon is the best instance of this dual potential). Despite its finitude, its modest 
if not literally diminutive dimensions – which lead us to refer to it as a “mere 
place,” “where I happen to be now”: as if this locus does not matter much, that it 
is gratuitous – place has a remarkably extensive outreach, a generous and 
hospitable nature as it were. Enclosed within itself by means of such distinctive 
edges as borders and boundaries (and other types of edge like rims and 
peripheries), it is also enclosive of much else: people and animals, things and 
occurrences. This is part of the deep paradoxicality of place, and it doubtless 
what makes it such an effective partner of the postmodern – which thrives on 
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paradoxes, including the manifest paradox that it, the postmodern in its errant 
motions and offbeat thematics, flourishes in place.  
But what does it mean for the postmodern to flourish in place? Lyotard 
gives one concrete example in The Postmodern Condition: the social or political 
enclave that nourishes creative thought and action despite it comparative 
isolation. “Enclave” here is not an instance of the local absolute as discussed 
earlier: there, the absolute inhabits the local itself: the universal space at stake in 
globalization is to be found in a local circumstance itself – right there, fully there. 
Now, in contrast, the local sidesteps the global: it is truly set apart, on the side, in 
the margins. There is no elegant (or impossible: depending on how one views the 
global absolute) compromise or compression, but instead a setting aside of an 
alternative space, a given place that stands apart from the juggernaut of 
contemporary and future technologies, offering a zone of its own in which life 
can be lived experimentally and vibrantly. (Copenhagen offered such an enclave, 
for example, in the evolution of jazz, being a creative locus that was all the more 
effective and impressive for being off-center in the world jazz scene. I suspect 
that it has served in a similar capacity at other moments of its history: think only 
of Kierkegaard in the wake of Hegel and Schelling in their ascendancy in the 
more widely recognized university centers or his time such as Berlin.)  
Such a zone of creative action as an enclave offers is akin to D.W. 
Winnicott’s idea of a “transitional space” in which the child – and the adult in a 
later phase – first comes to a deeper sense of personal identity. As creatively 
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transitional, the postmodern enclave is a matter of place that prospers precisely 
in it being situated away from the dominant centers of global culture. The very 
idea of the “avant garde” in literature and the fine arts embodies much the same 
sense of being a harbor for innovative thought and action in a “scene” (another 
place term that is tinged with the improvisational and provisional) that is often 
far from the hegemonic cultural centers: Zurich and Paris, Harlem and Black 
Mountain early in the twentieth century; today, among others: Prague in Europe, 
Portland in the U.S. Part of being an avant-garde place is, precisely, to be 
transitional: not to last long enough to become institutionalized (which is 
equivalent to the avant-garde’s demise). The survival of such enclaves may be 
foreshortened, their longevity short-lived; but the shadow they cast is long in 
terms of influences and effects. 
 
    V 
 
In bringing this lecture to a close – coming to its very edge – I would like 
to return to my major theme of the edges of places, this time briefly exploring 
one final aspect: the considerable outreach of such edges.  
As I have underlined at several points, edges not only close off place but 
connect them with what is beyond, or other than, the place in question. For one 
thing, through their edges places themselves link up with other places. For 
instance, the edges of a given neighborhood are where that neighborhood is in 
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touch with nearby neighborhoods: not only geographically and physically but in 
other, much less visible ways – legally, through demographic patterns, or by 
economic flows of various sorts. Moreover, such edges are continually shifting as 
the character and occupants of a certain neighborhood alter. They are also 
indefinite: if one knows where the south edge of Harlem is found (i.e., 110th St.), 
who knows just where this part of New York City ends as one moves out from 
this southernmost edge? When the edge is definite and known, its connection 
with another place and its edge are more determinate in character, but since the 
exact location of the edges of many places (and regions) is not known Harlem’s 
tie with these other loci is often quite amorphous. (Here what C.S. Peirce called 
“the logic of the vague” comes into concrete play.) 
The edges of places also give access to places whose scale exceeds that of a 
given original place: say, the way that the Lower East Side of New York City 
gives out onto the whole of this borough and, beyond it (and through its edges) 
with the entire unit called “Manhattan.” Operative here is a kind of transitivity of 
placial edges that allows them to connect up with ever more capacious entities: 
not only entire cities but (moving to the natural world) bioregions via 
watersheds, landforms, and a complete bioclimate – eventually, the earth as a 
whole.  
The foregoing examples are cases of what I like to call “external edges,” 
those that surround a given place. But some edges of a given place are also 
“internal.” I refer to the inner differentiations of a given place – ridges and rills in 
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its surface; but I also refer to being a body in that place: here the outer edges of 
my body are intimately bound up with the inner edges of a built or natural 
environment. To adapt a sentence of Merleau-Ponty’s: a lived body is in a place 
as the heart is in the organism.3
The plot thickens further when we realize that through the edges of 
certain places we are in touch with various cultural and linguistic traditions that 
would not be otherwise accessible to us.  These traditions – a “mother tongue,” a 
way of construing political or religious events, etc. – are reached from the very 
peripheries of the places where we are now situated. In such cases, the access is 
not physical or geographic, or demographic or economic, but occurs through a 
form of diffusion of interest or energy that moves outward from particular 
personal or collective centers (whether in the form of selves or groups) and then 
back again into these same centers. The same is true for belonging to certain 
histories of a people, a race, a nation: here as well there is radiation outward 
through the edges of the places occupy – and also an absorption from without. In 
 Here the emphasis is on the way in which the 
very skin of our lived bodies enables us to be active in certain particular 
circumstances such as sports events, talking with others, or simply walking with 
them: “I was the world in which I walked,” says Wallace Stevens; but this world 
is accessible to me through a concerted bodily motion that has its own edges. 
Also, insofar as we live in a particular place or region, we in that locus: we reside 
there, act there, live there. 
                                                        
3 [Cite M-P in PP, probably from ch. 5 or 6.] 
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all the aforementioned cases, we have to do with another form of dyad, that 
realized by a two-way movement of culture, language, and history in and out of 
the several intentionalities that compose human beings alone and together. 
Here two particular observations, one bearing on other cultures and the 
second on literature: 
(a) When we attempt to understand what is happening – in action or in 
text – that stems from a distinctly different culture than our own, we must 
exercise our interpretive powers in a very concerted way (otherwise, we remain 
smugly ensconced in our own cultural presuppositions). In order to make the 
interpretive leap, we have to open the edges of our own paradigms of 
understanding so as to reach out to those of another time or culture, society or 
race. We do so precisely by what Gadamer calls the “fusion of horizons” 
(Horizontverschmelzung) where by the otherwise hardened edges of our own 
cultural premises and prejudices become sufficiently porous to receive and grasp 
what others, from a very different circumstance, mean to say. In other words, 
these edges, instead of acting as fiercely guarded borders, must become 
boundarylike – that is, open to the radically different and to the exchange of 
ideas at a deep level: one group of edges, those of our own cultural place, reaches 
out to rejoin, chevron-style, the edges of a very different cultural location. 
(b) In literature, we have set before us intense and often paradigmatic 
cases of this same dyad, that is, through the verbal description of 
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intentional actors as they form part of events that are ineluctably cultural and 
historical. Here, too, the edges of places remain critical: now in the form of the 
perimeters of states of affairs as narrated by the author (and as voiced or thought 
by the characters of a novel or play or poem). Every such state of affairs – I 
borrow this term from Ingarden, who refers to them as “Sachverhalten” in his 
Literary Work of Art – has its own peculiar edge in and through which the many 
strands of action and plot are absorbed or reflected. But (as Ingarden and others 
have shown) the matter is very complex, and I here only allude to a first level of 
analysis – trusting that we might pursue other levels in our discussion later 
today or tomorrow. 
 Underlying all this and making it possible is a primal model of human 
beings as organic entities – not just as living creatures but at every level of 
experience that their physiologically organic being makes possible. Instead of the 
social (and other kinds of) atomism that would keep humans tightly contained 
within themselves, beings of borders rather than boundaries (as on Aristotle’s 
notion of place as a rigidly delimited container), my analysis today points toward 
a very different view of the relationship between edge and place. On this view, 
both are organic in character, and that which makes this possible is the body as 
their mediatrix, their common bond. The body is the archetypally organismic, 
and from its exemplary status as a living organism it establishes what it is like for 
edges to operate in the manner of shared joints and tissues: that is to say, as 
forming a dense and continuous integumentation. Just as something happening 
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in one part of the body affects what is happening everywhere in that same body 
– thanks to the interpolation of edges that link disparate places in and of the 
organism. Just as John Milton said that “the mind is its own place” (adding that 
this place is, all too often, a hell from which we cannot escape), so we can say 
that the body is its own place too: or better yet it is place’s close sibling.  
With the body/place pair I designate a final indefinite dyad, about which 
I like to say this: no body without place, no place without body. They are 
inseparable if distinguishable brother and sister. One is integral to the other, 
necessary to it arising and continued existing. But this can happen only if the 
edges of the body and those of place interdigitate intimately.  
More completely considered, we have a situation that can be analogized to 
a triangle whose two lower corners are occupied by edges and places while the 
apex is body regarded as the supreme (or, as Wallace Stevens might say: as its 
“supreme fiction”). But this requires us to take a step beyond an indefinite dyad 
by moving to an indefinite triad: edge/place/body. In view of this trio – a far cry 
from Hegel’s dialectic of ternary terms progressively advancing – we can 
glimpse the enormous complication of the relationship between edges and places 
at every level while also marvelling at their beautifully articulated relationships 
as modeled on the bodily life of all living organisms. 
 
*  *  *  *  *  * 
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This is a life like that of human beings -- like you and me. Or, for that 
matter, like characters in a novel or short story. Or like the character of local 
culture – or like another quite different culture. And like my language – like 
yours. Like being American – like being Danish. Like being all these things, and 
many more, in one infinitely complex yet still organismic entity. This entity is 
situated in place, and it is enlivened and expressed through the edges it proffers 
and to which it gives rise. For place, like body, engenders edges; edges describe 
and distinguish place and body alike. The bond between all three goes deep – 
deeper than we can know (objectively) but not deeper than we can intuit or infer 
as natural subjects. Into this multiply determined depth – a depth that manifests 
itself on the scalloped surfaces (that is, the edges) of bodies and places – I invite 
you to enter and to join with me in open discussion.  
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